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SUMMARIES 
Using both published and unpublished letters and 
manuscripts, this article shows that Burali-Forti's 
paradox, which has long been regarded as the first of 
the set-theoretical paradoxes to be discovered, was 
not created by either Burali-Forti or Cantor. It 
arose gradually and began to take recognizable form 
only in Russell's The Principles of Mathematics of 
1903. Russell's long-standing predisposition to seek 
paradoxes was a vestige of the Kantian and Hegelian 
philosophical traditions in which he was schooled. 
Between 1904 and 1906, Burali-Forti's paradox was 
nurtured by Jourdain and Poincare, both of whom con- 
sidered it to be more fundamental than Russell did. 
To the end, both Burali-Forti and Cantor maintained 
that there was no such paradox. 
Depuis longtemps, les historiens ont cru que le 
premier des paradoxes ensemblistes jamais decouvert 
etait le paradoxe de Burali-Forti. En s'appuyant sur 
des lettres et documents publies ou inedits, cet essai 
montre que, ni Burali-Forti ni Cantor n'ont cr& ce 
paradoxe. Bien autrement, ce paradoxe Qmergea petit 2 
petit et ne prit vraiment forme que dans The Principles 
of Mathematics de Russell en 1903. La traditionelle 
predilection de Russell h chercher des paradoxes 
d&o&e des traditions philosophiques kantienne et 
hegelienne dans lesquelles il fut &dug&. Entre 1904 
et 1906, c'est Jourdain et Poincare qui ont d&elopp& 
le paradoxe de Burali-Forti; tous deux le consideraient 
comme plus fondamental que Russell ne le croyait. 
Jusqu'au bout, Burali-Forti et Cantor insistaient qu'il 
n'y avait pas de tel paradoxe. 
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Usando cartas y manuscritos ineditos y publicados, 
este articulo muestra que la paradoja de Burali-Forti, 
la cual ha sido observada por mucho tiempo coma la 
primera de las paradojas de la teoria de conjuntos en 
haber sido descubierta, no fue creada ni por Burali- 
Forti ni por Cantor. Esta surgid gradualmente y empez6 
a tomar forma reconocible en el The Principles of Math- 
ematics de Russell de 1903. La predisposition de 
Russell por buscar paradojas fue un vestigio de las 
tradiciones filos6ficas kantianas y hegelianas en las 
que fue educado. Entre 1904 y 1906, la forma de la 
paradoja maduro a trav& de1 trabajo de Jourdain y 
Poincare, quienes la consideraron mucho ma's fundamental 
de lo que la habia considerado Russell. Burali-Forti 
y Cantor siempre pensaron que no existia tal paradoja. 
In history we need to con- 
struct ignorance situations 
for ow? h.istoricaZ figures, 
that is, branches of re2e- 
vant knowledge constructed 
between their period and 
OUTS of which they were 
essentia22y ignorant. 
--I. Grattan-Guinness 
[1975, 4831 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Historians and mathematicians have long agreed that the set- 
theoretic and logical paradoxes, discovered near the end of the 
19th century, quickly revolutionized the foundations of mathe- 
matics. Furthermore, historians as diverse as Bochenski [1961, 
3881, Bourbaki [1969, 461, Kline [1972, 10031, W. Kneale and 
M. Kneale [1962, 6521, and van Heijenoort [1967, 1041 have all 
stated that the Italian mathematician Cesare Burali-Forti pub- 
lished the first such paradox in 1897. Thus it may surprise the 
reader to learn that Burali-Forti did not publish a paradox in 
1897, or at any other time [ll. 
Where and how, we may then ask, did Burali-Forti's paradox 
originate? While it has been suggested that Cantor first form- 
ulated Burali-Forti's paradox, this answer, too, requires mod- 
ification (see Sections 4 and 5). To answer our question, we 
have found it necessary to examine the historical relationship 
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between Burali-Forti's paradox and the other paradoxes, such as 
Russell's, which arose during the same period. Our research has 
led us to conclude that Burali-Forti's paradox originated not all 
at once, but little by little, primarily through the labors of 
Bertrand Russell. Moreover, the emergence of Burali-Forti's 
paradox depended on a "Gestalt switch," a reversal of figure and 
ground, the essential elements of which had been present for 
some time [2]. For these reasons and others, we have abandoned 
the traditional emphasis on who originally stated the paradox in 
question. In fact, both what was stated and what was meant by 
the paradox underwent a transformation in the hands of English, 
French, German, and Italian mathematicians during the decade 
following 1897. The process by which Burali-Forti's paradox 
originated, diffused, and metamorphosed into a form recognizable 
to mathematicians today was essentially complete by 1907. 
In the present article, we distinguish sharply between the 
terms paradox and contradiction, a distinction not necessarily 
made by mathematicians of the period. In his argument Burali- 
Forti arrived at both a conclusion and its negation--hence at 
a contradiction. By contrast, a paradox (as we shall use the 
term) is an argument which ends in a contradiction although all 
of its premises and modes of reasoning are prima facie acceptable. 
In particular, a paradox requires that the one who discovers it 
give up a premise or mode of reasoning that he has previously 
accepted as correct. Thus a paradox appears "paradoxical" to 
its author if he is uncertain which of his premises to abandon. 
To Burali-Forti, on the other hand, it was evident that the 
trichotomy of ordinals was unacceptable as a premise and was, 
in fact, false. Therefore Burali-Forti's argument did not con- 
stitute a paradox when he wrote his article [1897a], and he did 
not find his result threatening in any way. Yet through the 
labors of various mathematicians, his argument would eventually 
be transformed into a paradox. 
2. BURALI-FORT1 
From the beginning, two mathematicians inspired Burali-Forti 
to investigate the foundations of mathematics: Giuseppe Peano 
and Georg Cantor. During the academic year 1893-1894 Burali- 
Forti lectured at the University of Turin on Peano's mathema- 
tical logic and soon published these lectures as a slim volume 
[1894a]. At the same time he completed an article [1894b] 
expressing Cantor's theory of transfinite ordinals in Peanoesque 
symbolism. 
While the article faithfully mirrored Cantor's theory in 
most respects, Burali-Forti misconstrued the definition of well- 
ordered set. A decade earlier Cantor had first introduced this 
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notion in the following fashion: An ordered set is well-ordered 
if it contains a first element, if any element with a successor 
has an immediate successor, and if any finite or infinite set of 
elements which has a successor also has an immediate successor 
[1883a, 548-5491. Perhaps because of the meandering fashion in 
which Cantor had stated this definition, it was misunderstood by 
Jacques Hadamard [1897, 2011 and Burali-Forti, among others. In 
particular, Burali-Forti retained only the first two clauses of 
Cantor's definition: An ordered class is well-ordered if 
(a) it contains a first element, and 
(b) every element with a successor has an immediate 
successor. [1894a, 1721 [31 
Thus Burali-Forti did not require, as Cantor had done, that every 
infinite set of elements with an upper bound have a least upper 
bound. This misunderstanding is vital if one wishes to grasp 
why Burali-Forti did not discover Burali-Forti's paradox. 
After reading Cantor's seminal article (18951 on the theory 
of cardinal numbers and order-types, Burali-Forti investigated 
two problems in cardinal arithmetic that Cantor had left open: 
to prove the Equivalence Theorem (if z 5 E and E 2 A=, then 5 = z) 
and to establish the trichotomy law for cardinals 
(A < E or li = B or S < 2). Although Burali-Forti made little 
progress on the first problem (resolved shortly thereafter by 
Felix Bernstein), he deduced the trichotomy of cardinals from 
two new postulates which he introduced: 
(1) If A is a class of non-empty classes, then the 
cardinal number of A is less than or equal to the 
cardinal number of the union of A. 
(2) For any classes A and B, there is a function 
f:A+B which is either one-one or onto. 11896, 236-2371 [41 
Next, Burali-Forti wished to determine whether trichotomy 
also held between all pairs of ordinal numbers. In fact, his 
famous article of 1897 was an attempt to refute trichotomy in 
this case by exhibiting two ordinal numbers a and 8 such that 
neither CL < 8 nor a = B nor fi < ~1. More precisely, he intended 
to define two order-types, c1 and 8, of "perfectly ordered classes' 
which violated trichotomy. Here his misunderstanding led him 
astray, for he continued to believe that an ordered class A was 
well-ordered if and only if it satisfied conditions (a) and (b) 
stated above. As a result he introduced the more restrictive 
concept of perfectly ordered class, which satisfied not only (a) 
and (b) but also a new condition: 
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(c) for every x in A, if x has an immediate predecessor 
then there is some predecessor y of x such that y has no 
immediate predecessor and that only finitely many ele- 
ments of A are between y and x. [1897a, 1571 
When Burali-Forti completed his article in February 1897, he 
thought that every perfectly ordered class was well-ordered, but 
that the converse failed to hold. Thus he believed that the 
concepts of well-ordered class and of perfectly ordered class 
were quite distinct. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
these two sorts of classes was to prove quite problematical. 
Burali-Forti began his construction, intended to violate 
trichotomy, by introducing the class NO of all order-types of 
perfectly ordered classes. He showed that if trichotomy held, 
then NO was itself a perfectly ordered class. Consequently its 
order-type R was a member of NO, as was R + 1. But if u E NO, 
then CI I a; hence both R < Q + 1 and Sl + 1 < R held, a contra- 
diction. He concluded that it was impossible to order the class 
of all order-types, or even its subclass NO--an essential defect 
which, he argued, kept NO from serving as a "standard class" for 
the order-types in the way that the natural numbers did for finite 
classes [1897a, 163-1641. Nevertheless, he did not think that he 
had found a paradox in Cantor's work, but rather that he had shown 
the theory of order-types to contain an essential limitation. Al- 
though now we can easily rephrase Burali-Forti's argument in terms 
of well-ordered sets, and so give rise to a paradox, Burali-Forti 
never did so. The only contradiction in his paper was the usual 
one found in any proof by reductio ad absurdum. 
Later in 1897, Burali-Forti read Cantor's article 11897, 2161 
which established that the order-types of well-ordered sets sat- 
isfy trichotomy. What Burali-Forti concluded was, not that the 
theory of transfinite ordinals generated a paradox, but that he 
had misread Cantor's definition of well-ordered set. In October 
Burali-Forti composed a brief note [1897b] which rectified the 
error and stated Cantor's full definition of well-ordered set, 
discussed above. There he emphasized as well that he had not 
made use of well-ordered classes in his earlier paper [1897a], 
nor of classes satisfying conditions (a) and (b), but solely of 
perfectly ordered classes. Having now defined well-ordered 
classes correctly, he concluded that (contrary to his earlier 
claim) every well-ordered class is perfectly ordered, but that 
some perfectly ordered classes are not well-ordered. Trichotomy 
held for the order-types of well-ordered classes but not for 
those of perfectly ordered classes. No disagreement, he believed, 
arose between his results and those of Cantor. 
This interpretation of Burali-Forti's work was adopted as 
well by his compatriot Giulio Vivanti, who wrote the abstract 
for Burali-Forti's articles of 1897 which appeared in the 
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Jahrbuch iiber die Fortschritte der Mathematik in 1900 [Vivanti 
1900, 62-631. No paradox was mentioned in that abstract, and 
no other reference to Burali-Forti's articles [1897a,b] seems to 
have been published prior to 1902. Thus, contrary to the inter- 
pretation usually accepted today, it is false that Burali-Forti's 
paper "immediately aroused the interest of the mathematical 
world . .." [van Heijenoort 1967, 1051. For five years no public 
reaction occurred at all. 
3. RUSSELL AND COUTURAT 
What ended the silence surrounding Burali-Forti's articles 
of 1897? Who recognized after half a decade that Burali-Forti's 
argument could be transferred to the well-ordered sets? Who, 
indeed, transformed Burali-Forti's argument into a paradox? 
In brief, it was primarily Bertrand Russell who brought about 
this transformation during the period 1900-1903. The first ex- 
plicit statement of Burali-Forti's paradox, as a paradox, occur- 
red in Russell's book The Principles of Mathematics [1903, 3231. 
By January 1901 Russell had already come close to glimpsing 
Burali-Forti's paradox of the largest ordinal, the paradox of the 
largest cardinal, and his own paradox (see [Coffa 19791). In 
order to understand what took place, it will be helpful to ex- 
amine his mathematical activities around this period. 
Russell began to search for paradoxes in mathematics much 
earlier than is usually recognized. His predisposition to invent 
such paradoxes had its roots in the philosophical antinomies of 
Kant and Hegel, both of whom deeply influenced his early develop- 
ment as a philosopher. In particular, the introduction to his 
unpublished Hegelian essay, "On Some Difficulties of Continuous 
Quantity," shows that this predilection was already present in 
1896: 
But it seemed worthwhile to collect and define . . . some 
contradictions in the relation of continuous quantity 
to number, and also to show, what mathematicians are 
in danger of forgetting, that philosophical antinomies, 
in this sphere, find their counterpart in mathematical 
fallacies. These fallacies seem . . . to pervade the 
Calculus, and even the more elaborate machinery of 
Cantor's collections (Mengen). 
Russell had first learned of Cantor's work, and had first become 
mistrustful of Cantorian set theory, by reading a book on atomism 
by the French Kantian philosopher Arthur Hannequin [1895, 48-711. 
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There Cantor's researches on the continuum of real numbers were 
analyzed at length and condemned as contradictory. In his review 
of this book Russell regarded the contradiction, which Hannequin 
had detected in Cantor, as merely Kant's second antinomy from 
the Critique of Pure Reason: every composite substance both is, 
and is not, made up of simple parts [Russell 1896, 4121. 
Within the next three years Russell had found in Cantorian 
set theory a paradox close to that of the largest cardinal. For 
during 1899 he undertook a draft of The Principles, and in the 
outline for Part II he wrote: 
Chapter VII. Antinomy of Infinite Number. This arises 
most simply from applying the idea of a totality to 
numbers. There is, and is not, a number of numbers. 
This [and] causality are the only antinomies known to 
me. This one is more all-pervading.... No existing 
metaphysic avoids this antinomy. 
It is likely that Russell developed the "antinomy of infinite 
number" by reading Leibniz. At this time Russell was preparing 
his book, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, 
for publication, and in an appendix of excerpts from Leibniz' 
writings on logic he quoted that "the number of all numbers 
implies a contradiction" [Russell 1900, 2441. Here was a seed 
that could grow into the paradox of the largest cardinal. Yet 
in 1899 Russell lacked a method for making this claim rigorous 
and so obtaining a genuine paradox. Such a method appeared the 
following year when he made the acquaintance of Peano's symbolic 
logic. 
During July 1900 Russell attended the first International 
Congress of Philosophy in Paris and was greatly impressed by 
Peano. After studying his writings in August, Russell began to 
extend the Peanoesque symbolism to his own logic of relations. 
In October, Russell wrote another draft of The Principles. This 
draft, containing most of the final version of 1902, was com- 
pleted during December 1900 [1967, 1453. 
At that time Russell discovered what he believed to be a 
number of errors in Cantor's writings. On 8 December 1900 he 
corresponded with his friend, the French philosopher Louis 
Couturat, about these supposed errors. One of them concerned 
Cantor's theory of real numbers, but more important to us here 
was what Russell wrote about an "error" involving cardinal 
numbers: 
I have discovered a mistake in Cantor, who main- 
tains that there is no largest cardinal number. But 
the number of classes is the largest number. The best 
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of Cantor's proofs to the contrary can be found in 
Jahresb. d. deutschen fiJath. Ver'g., I, 1892, pp. 75- 
78 [Cantor 18911. In effect it amounts to showing 
that, if u is a class whose number is CL, the number 
of classes included in u (which is 2") is larger than 
ct. The proof presupposes that there are classes in- 
cluded in u which are not individuals [members] of u; 
but if u=Class, that is false: [for] every class of 
classes is a class. [51 
Why Russell believed Cantor's proof to make such a presupposition 
is not at all clear. 
This passage contains all the ingredients that Russell needed 
to create the paradox of the largest cardinal. Intriguingly, he 
did not believe at the time that a paradox was present or even 
that Cantor's theory was endangered in some way. Instead he 
argued that Cantor's theorem [1891]--for every set A, the set of 
all subsets of A has a higher power than A--did not hold when A 
was the class of all classes, and hence that Cantor had erred in 
denying the existence of a largest cardinal [6]. Thus it was not 
a new discovery, but a shift in how he perceived an argument 
which he already possessed, that later led Russell to formulate 
clearly and convincingly the paradox of the largest cardinal. 
Replying to Russell's letter on 3 January 1901, Couturat in- 
troduced a new subject into the discussion: Burali-Forti. 
The errors in Cantor which you pointed out to me 
seem very interesting; but I am far from this subject, 
and, immersed in Leibniz, I do not have the leisure to 
study it. The infinite lends itself so easily to pa- 
ralogisms! Burali-Forti has claimed to prove that it 
is false to assert for order-types that: 
(a = b) U (a < b) U (a > b) 
and consequently that they do not form a well-ordered 
class. His reasoning is more specious than convincing. 
("Una questione sui numeri transfiniti ," in Rendiconti 
de1 Circolo matematico di Palermo 28 March 1897 (Vol. 
XI). I can lend you the article if you wish.) I won- 
der whether one can consider the class of all possible 
classes without some sort of contradiction. [Appendix 11 
Thus Couturat remained dubious that Burali-Forti had shown the 
trichotomy of ordinals to be false, but he was equally dubious 
of Russell's class of all classes. 
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Although he had not known of Burali-Forti's article, Russell 
had reached a similar conclusion. In his letter to Couturat of 
17 January, Russell wrote: 
I agree with Burali-Forti that it is false to 
assert 
a=b. U .a < b. U .a > b 
for order-types. What is more, I suspect that one can- 
not assert the same thing for cardinal numbers either. 
Cantor's arguments on this subject are not conclusive. 
I would be very grateful if you would lend me Burali- 
Forti's article, which I have not seen. [Appendix 21 
When Couturat and Russell used the term "order-type" here, it is 
probable that they meant "ordinal." For the familiar order-types 
w and *w (of the positive integers with <, and >, respectively) 
certainly violated trichotomy if order-types in general were in- 
tended. Unfortunately, Russell's letter stated no reason why 
he denied the trichotomy of ordinals. It is significant that 
he also doubted the trichotomy of cardinals, which Burali-Forti 
had deduced from new axioms in a paper [1896] unknown to Russell 
at the time. For the trichotomy of cardinals was intimately re- 
lated to the question of well-ordering an arbitrary set, a sub- 
ject to which we shall turn in the next section. 
On the other hand, Russell vigorously defended his class of 
all classes: 
If you grant that there is a contradiction in this 
concept, then the infinite always remains contradic- 
tory, and your work as well as that of Cantor has not 
solved the philosophical problem. For there is a 
concept Class and there are classes. Hence Class 
is a class. But one can prove (and this is essential 
to Cantor's theory) that every class has a cardinal 
number. [Appendix 21 
Russell noted further that "no contradiction results" from Class 
(the class of all classes) since, as he had remarked in his 
previous letter, Cantor's proof of 1891 did not apply to it. 
Yet Russell remained vague as to why Cantor's proof did not 
apply in this case as well (and thus engender a paradox). 
On 27 January 1901 Couturat had lingering doubts about Class: 
"Is the class Class determined, closed so to speak, in such a 
way as to possess a cardinal number?" [Appendix 31. Russell 
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responded on 1 February that Class was indeed well defined since 
for any x it was determined whether or not x belonged to Class. 
He added that Burali-Forti's papers had arrived, which he read 
"with great interest." 
Thus by early in 1901 Russell had come close to creating 
both the paradox of the largest cardinal and that of the largest 
ordinal. Although neither paradox crystallized at the time, he 
continued to ponder the seeming contradictions of the infinite. 
In a popular article he discussed Zeno's paradoxes and also 
commented on Cantorian set theory: 
On the subject of infinity it is impossible to avoid 
conclusions which at first sight appear paradoxical, 
and this is the reason why so many philosophers have 
supposed that there were inherent contradictions in 
the infinite. But a little practice enables one to 
grasp the true principles of Cantor's doctrine, and 
to acquire new and better instincts as to the true 
and the false. [Russell 1901, 1011 
Here Russell, while still concerned with "errors" in Cantor's 
work, revealed again his tendency to seek paradoxes in set 
theory. Yet, as he later informed Philip Jourdain [1913, 1461, 
he did not discover his own paradox until June 1901; when he 
composed this article in January, he knew only that Cantor's 
proof of 1891, that there is no largest cardinal, contained a 
mistake. On 21 July 1901 Couturat wrote to Russell concerning 
the article: "It is quite profound beneath its popular guise, 
and pleased me a great deal. Beneath the paradoxes hide some 
striking truths" [Appendix 41. This premonition turned out to 
be quite accurate, although Couturat did not know that Russell's 
paradox-hunting had just succeeded. 
When Russell, in June 1901, found the paradox which now 
bears his name, he failed at first to recognize its importance. 
Apparently he wrote to no one about it at the time. In parti- 
cular, no reference to it occurs either in his voluminous cor- 
respondence with his wife Alys, or in that with Couturat, before 
mid-1902 [7]. 
Why did Russell remain silent about his paradox for an entire 
year? Two letters, one to Alys and one to Couturat, help to ex- 
plain Russell's silence during the period between discovering his 
paradox and describing it, first to Peano, and then on 16 June 
1902 to Frege [Frege 1976, 211-2121. On 25 June, Russell wrote 
to his wife: "I have heard from Frege, a most candid letter; 
he says that my conundrum makes not only his Arithmetic, but all 
possible Arithmetics, totter" 181. It was the fact that Frege, 
whom Russell admired intensely, regarded Russell's paradox as 
devastating that helped to convince him of its importance. Over 
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the next two months they exchanged nine lengthy letters concern- 
ing the paradox and its possible solutions [Frege 1976, 211-2271. 
Russell then revised the chapter on his contradiction in The 
Principles, a chapter which he had first written not long be- 
fore [9]. 
The second letter to clarify Russell's year-long silence 
contained the first mention of his paradox to Couturat. "I am 
very busy with my book," Russell wrote of The Principles on 
29 September 1902, 
which is being printed slowly, and by vol. II, which 
I am preparing in collaboration with Whitehead. I 
do not know what to do about a class of contradictions 
of which the simplest is this: 
w=x3(x - EX) -J :XEW. s .x-cx: 1 :wcw. E .W-EW. 
I have tried many solutions without success. One ob- 
tains contradictions of this sort by taking Cantor's 
proof that there is no largest cardinal and applying 
it to the class of all individuals, or of all propo- 
sitions, or of all relations. When my book began to 
be printed, I believed I could avoid these contradic- 
tions, but now I see that I was mistaken, a fact which 
greatly diminishes the value of my book. [Appendix 51 
This passage suggests strongly that, little by little, Russell 
came to place his paradox at the center of his foundational con- 
cerns. So long as he believed that his paradox could be solved 
without great difficulty (by deciding which assumption to aban- 
don), there was no reason to treat it as fundamental. Only after 
failing at numerous attempts to solve it and only after Frege 
underlined its importance did Russell regard the paradox as 
crucial. 
By focusing on the importance of his own paradox, Russell 
also shifted his perspective on Burali-Forti's work. Writing 
in 1902 for Peano's journal Rivista di Matematica, he stated a 
reservation about Burali-Forti's article [1897a]. This reser- 
vation constituted Russell's attempt to make sense of both 
Burali-Forti's and Cantor's articles. For the first time in 
print, he cast doubt on Cantor's fundamental proposition that 
every set can be well-ordered [Russell 1902, 331. On the other 
hand he had become convinced that Cantor's argument of 1897 
establishing the trichotomy of ordinals was correct. Faced with 
Burali-Forti's article, he decided to deny that the less-than 
relation on the ordinals was a well-ordering, even though he 
granted that every segment (i.e., the class of those ordinals 
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less than a given ordinal) was well-ordered [1902, 431. All the 
same, Russell made no mention of any paradox. 
When The Principles appeared in 1903, Russell took a similar 
stand on this matter in all but one respect: He now believed 
that Burali-Forti's argument generated a paradox. In this way 
Burali-Forti's paradox of the largest ordinal was finally born: 
There is a difficulty as regards the type of the 
whole series of ordinal numbers. It is easy to prove 
that every segment of this series is well-ordered, and 
it is natural to suppose that the whole series is also 
well-ordered. If so, its type would have to be the 
greatest of all ordinal numbers, for the ordinals less 
than a given ordinal form, in order of magnitude, a 
series whose type is the given ordinal. But there 
cannot be a greatest ordinal number, because every 
ordinal is increased by the addition of 1. From this 
contradiction, M. Burali-Forti, who discovered it, 
infers that of two different ordinals, as of two dif- 
ferent cardinals, it is not necessary that one should 
be greater and the other less. In this, however, he 
consciously contradicts a theorem of Cantor's which 
affirms the opposite. I have examined this theorem 
with all possible care, and have failed to find any 
flaw in the proof. But there is another premiss in 
M. Burali-Forti's argument, which appears to me more 
capable of denial, and that is, that the series of all 
ordinal numbers is well-ordered. This does not follow 
from the fact that all its segments are well-ordered, 
and must, I think, be rejected, since, so far as I 
know, it is incapable of proof. In this way, it would 
seem, the contradiction in question can be avoided. 
[Russell 1903, 3231 
It is important to note that Russell was employing the term 
"contradiction" in the sense of a paradox and not, like Burali- 
Forti, as part of an argument reductio ad absurdum. Some pages 
earlier, Russell had repeatedly referred to his own paradox by 
the term "contradiction" [1903, lOl-1071. Through juxtaposing 
Burali-Forti's and Cantor's articles of 1897, Russell created 
the paradox of the largest ordinal. Whether he believed that 
Burali-Forti's perfectly ordered classes and Cantor's well- 
ordered ones coincide (they do not) or whether he merely trans- 
ferred Burali-Forti's argument to the well-ordered classes, it 
was here that Burali-Forti's paradox first reached print. 
Russell considered himself to have solved it by denying that 
the class of all ordinals, taken in their usual order, was well- 
ordered. Nevertheless, influenced by Jourdain, he soon reversed 
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himself and came to regard Burali-Forti's paradox as a signifi- 
cant unresolved problem. 
Since Russell composed The Principles over a period of sev- 
eral years, he might have conceived of Burali-Forti's paradox-- 
as a paradox--even before he clearly formulated his own. Thanks 
to material in the Russell Archives, we can be reasonably certain 
that this was not the case. He completed the final draft of 
The Principles on 23 May 1902 [Russell 1967, 1511. This draft, 
as well as earlier ones kept in the Russell Archives, contains 
no mention of Burali-Forti's paradox. In particular the final 
draft lacks sections 299 and 300 of the printed version, as well 
as section 301 (quoted above) where Burali-Forti's paradox first 
occurs. Moreover, the pagination of the final draft is complete. 
Thus Russell evidently recognized, sometime between June 1902 
and May 1903, that Burali-Forti's argument could be transformed 
into a genuine paradox. yet, as we shall see, it was not Russell 
but Jourdain who first underlined the significance of Burali- 
Forti's paradox. 
4. CANTOR AND JOURDAIN 
In The Principles there occur three sorts of paradoxes. By 
far the most vital to Russell was his own paradox, together with 
its variants. A second sort, the breeding ground for the first, 
involved Cantor's proof of 1891 that there is no largest car- 
dinal; indeed, Russell was the first to publish the paradox of 
the largest cardinal, which he named Cantor's paradox [lo]. 
Last, there was the paradox of the largest ordinal, which he 
dubbed Burali-Forti's. Russeil regarded his own paradox as the 
most fundamental and the least technical, since it required less 
set-theoretic machinery than the other two. Consequently, he 
concentrated his efforts on it. During 1906 he wrote to his 
compatriot Jourdain: "In 1905 for the first time I worked seri- 
ously at Burali-Forti's contradiction. I had never paid much 
attention to it before, because it was so much more complicated 
than mine that it seemed likely either to be soluble in some 
purely technical way, or to be not soluble until mine had been 
solved" (quoted in [Grattan-Guinness 1977, 801). Russell's 
philosophical notion of complexity, which did not rely on the 
symbolic complexity of the formal expression of a proposition, 
will not be analyzed here. 
In 1903, after reading The Principles, Jourdain himself be- 
came intrigued with the paradox of the largest ordinal. In 
fact, this paradox led him to formulate an argument for Cantor's 
proposition that every set can be well-ordered. Before sending 
this argument to Cantor, he showed it to G. H. Hardy, who then 
wrote Russell about it on 14 October: 
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I enclose a letter I received this morning from 
Jourdain (whom I think you know), . . . . The other point 
about the ~1's [alephs] is also interesting but I don't 
think Jourdain is right. For if anything seems obvious, 
it is that the series of ~1's does exist. I tried my- 
self when writing my Quarterly Journal paper [1903] to 
get an argument for every a being in the series (but 
came to the conclusion that I couldn't) out of Burali- 
Forti's contradiction. My line of argument was to show 
that adding one more to the whole series meant nothing 
if (and only if) it was already similar to the aggregate 
of all entities.... However if you have (as Whitehead 
says) solved all the difficulties about the greatest 
cardinal etc., I suppose you have solved Burali-Forti's 
contradiction too. [ill 
The issue over which Hardy and Jourdain disagreed was whether 
the set W of all ordinals, or that of all alephs, exists. For 
Jourdain had utilized W in his argument that every transfinite 
cardinal is an aleph (i.e., the cardinal of some well-ordered 
infinite set) and hence that every set can be well-ordered. 
On 29 October Jourdain sent a version of this argument to 
Cantor. In his reply of 4 November, Cantor revealed in turn 
that he had sent a similar proof to Richard Dedekind four years 
earlier and to David Hilbert some three years before that 
[Grattan-Guinness 1971, 115-1171. Although the letter to 
Hilbert in 1896 is no longer extant, two letters to Dedekind 
illuminate Cantor's perspective. 
The first of these letters, which Cantor wrote on 28 July 
1899, concerned the theory of cardinals: "The main question was 
whether there exist other [infinite] powers of sets besides the 
alephs; for two years I have been in possession of a proof that 
there are no others, . .." [Cantor 1932, 4431. He elaborated in 
a letter of 3 August [12]. The fundamental distinction which 
he introduced was that between consistent and inconsistent multi- 
plicities [Vielheiten] : "A multiplicity can be created such that 
the assumption that all its elements form a 'collection' leads 
to a contradiction, and thus it is impossible to conceive of the 
multiplicity as a unity or 'a completed thing.' Such multiplic- 
ities I call absolutely infinite or inconsistent multiplicities" 
[ibid.]. On the other hand he designated the consistent multi- 
plicities as sets [Mengen]. Here the principal distinction 
between the two types of multiplicity was one of size. 
Inconsistent multiplicities interested Cantor primarily be- 
cause they suggested a method for establishing his fundamental 
proposition that every set can be well-ordered. While in an 
earlier article [1883a, 5501 he had claimed that this proposition 
was "a law of thought," by 1895 he had come to believe that it 
HM8 Burali-Forti's Paradox 333 
required a demonstration. The first step in his proof, as com- 
municated to Dedekind, was to show that the collection R of all 
ordinals is inconsistent or absolutely infinite. For if R were 
consistent, then it would have an ordinal number 6 greater than 
every member of Q; but 6 was a member of Q and so 6 -X 6, an ab- 
surdity. To modern eyes, this passage strongly suggests Burali- 
Forti's paradox. Yet Cantor did not believe set theory to be 
threatened in any way by his argument. Thus he did not state 
Burali-Forti's paradox here--although he possessed all the in- 
gredients needed to do so--because he did not regard it as a 
paradox. In Cantor's eyes, there was simply the fact that some 
collections were too large to be sets. 
Cantor continued his argument by establishing that every 
transfinite cardinal was an aleph: If some infinite set V had 
no aleph as its cardinal, then V would have a subcollection V' 
in one-one correspondence to s2. Since 52 was inconsistent, so 
was V' and hence V as well. But by definition only sets (i.e., 
consistent multiplicities) possessed cardinal numbers, and hence 
V had no cardinal. Consequently every transfinite cardinal was 
an aleph, and every set could be well-ordered. 
In 1903, unaware of this correspondence of 1899, Jourdain 
sent Cantor his similar argument, also distinguishing between 
consistent and inconsistent collections. Jourdain requested 
permission to publish Cantor's proof found in his letter of 4 
November, but Cantor refused [Grattan-Guinness 1971, 115-1171. 
Yet Cantor encouraged Jourdain to publish his own version. On 
2 December 1903 Jourdain finished the article containing this 
version and submitted it to the Philosophical Magazine, where 
it was printed in January 1904. There, letting fi be the ordinal 
number of the well-ordered collection W of all ordinals, he 
stated that the cardinal of W would be K 
B' 
Then he added: 
But there can be neither a greatest ordinal nor a 
greatest Aleph; for, given i3, the type of the aggre- 
gate (1 . . . 6) is the ordinal number 6 + 1, and 
%+l>%, %+1 >H. 
This contradiction was first 
published by Burali-F&ti, who concluded from it that 
one must deny both Cantor's fundamental theorem in the 
theory of ordinal numbers that: if "1 and 012 are any 
two ordinal numbers, then either 
"1 < (32, or a1 = C12r or a1 ' a2.J 
and the corresponding theorem for Alephs. This con- 
clusion is, in fact, necessary if one admits Burali- 
Forti's premisses; and since Cantor's demonstration of 
the above theorem is beyond all possible objection, 
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Russell [1903] avoided the contradiction by denying the 
premiss that the series of all ordinal numbers, arranged 
in order of magnitude, is well-ordered.,.. But it ap- 
pears possible to prove that this series of all ordinal 
numbers is well-ordered.... [Jourdain 1904, 64-651 
Here Burali-Forti's paradox began to acquire a life of its 
Own, though one based on a misinterpretation. It seems that 
Jourdain had not read Burali-Forti's article, but simply relied 
on Russell's somewhat misleading account of it discussed above 
[131. In fact, Jourdain paraphrased the version of the paradox 
found in The Principles. Furthermore, in the passage above he 
echoed Cantor's letter of 4 November 1903 by mistakenly claiming 
that Burali-Forti had denied the trichotomy of cardinals. 
More important in this context is the fact that Jourdain 
rejected Russell's solution to Burali-Forti's paradox, since the 
solution denied that W is well-ordered. In particular, Jourdain's 
article established that a class is well-ordered if and only if 
it has no subclass of type *w. His result implied that the 
class W of all ordinals was well-ordered, and consequently that 
Russell's solution to the paradox of the largest ordinal had to 
be abandoned. Jourdain concluded: "There arises, then, an 
insuperable contradiction if we speak of W, or any similar ag- 
gregate, as having a cardinal number or ordinal type" [1904, 661. 
In contrast to Cantor's rather vague criterion for an inconsis- 
tent collection, Jourdain proposed the following formal defin- 
ition: An aggregate is inconsistent if it has a subaggregate 
in one-to-one correspondence with W. This definition, potentially 
quite fruitful, did not resolve the paradoxes in a way acceptable 
to Russell. 
In November 1905, if not sooner, Russell rejected Jourdain's 
proposition that a class is well-ordered if it lacks a subclass 
of type *w. On the other hand, by using transfinite induction, 
he established Jourdain's conclusion that W is well-ordered 
[1906, 351. In this way he abandoned his earlier solution to 
Burali-Forti's paradox. Soon thereafter he inclined more and 
more toward accepting his "no-classes theory" as a way out of 
the paradoxes, until he modified it to obtain the theory of 
types. Yet when he granted in 1905 that W is well-ordered, 
Russell reinforced the conviction, beginning to diffuse through 
the mathematical community, that Burali-Forti's paradox was a 
fundamental problem which had to be resolved. 
5. THE DIFFUSION OF BURALI-FORTI'S PARADOX 
As the year 1905 began, the paradox of the largest ordinal 
had not yet become a matter of concern to the community of 
HM8 Burali-Forti's Paradox 335 
mathematicians interested in set theory. Yet by the end of 1905, 
a major public debate--involving the paradox of the largest 
ordinal and related issues--was flourishing in England, Germany, 
and France. It was Jourdain's article [1904] that first turned 
Burali-Forti's paradox into a significant issue among mathema- 
ticians at large. 
Shortly before this diffusion began in earnest, Ernst Zermelo 
119041 had published a proof that every set can be well-ordered. 
Although in time his proof would be recognized as definitive, 
during 1905 a number of eminent mathematicians insisted that his 
demonstration had serious flaws (see [Moore 19781). In fact, 
several of these mathematicians regarded his proof as essentially 
identical to that of Jourdain, and so concluded mistakenly that 
Burali-Forti's paradox was entangled with both proofs. Moreover, 
although the various disputants disagreed as to how much set 
theory ought to be preserved, most believed that a substantial 
amount must be abandoned--perhaps even all the uncountable ordi- 
nals and cardinals. 
In England, the locus of the debate was the London Mathema- 
tical Society. Stimulated by Jourdain's article [1904], the 
analyst Ernest Hobson offered a caustic critique of Cantorian 
set theory in a paper read to the Society early in February 
1905. Hobson dismissed Jourdain's purported proof that every 
set can be well-ordered, and rejected Jourdain's proposed solu- 
tion to Burali-Forti's paradox. Nevertheless, Hobson's account 
of the previous history of the paradox echoed that already given 
in Jourdain's article. From the same data Hobson and Jourdain 
arrived at opposite conclusions. Concerning Jourdain's proposal 
to distinguish between consistent and inconsistent aggregates, 
and to refuse the latter both a cardinal number and an order- 
type, Hobson wrote: 
This amounts to a denial of the universal validity of 
the fundamental principle that every ordered aggregate 
has a definite order type: and yet it is by means of 
this very principle that the existence of the succes- 
sive ordinal numbers is regarded as having been esta- 
blished. Each successive ordinal number was defined 
to be the order type of the ordered aggregate of all 
the preceding ordinal numbers. [1905, 1711 
Because of Burali-Forti's paradox, Hobson argued, the founda- 
tions of set theory must be scrutinized with the greatest of care. 
He proposed radical surgery. While he acknowledged that w and 
aleph-zero were legitimate since there existed countable sets 
of geometric points with order-type w and cardinal number aleph- 
zero, he would not grant the same status to 01 and aleph-one, 
which were uncountable. There was no convincing reason, Hobson 
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insisted, to believe that some uncountable set can be well- 
ordered. In the same vein he denied the existence of the set 
of all ordinals as well as that of all cardinals. Moreover, he 
dismissed both Jourdain's and Zermelo's proofs, which he found 
quite similar, that every set can be well-ordered. Finally, he 
rejected as the source of Burali-Forti's paradox the principle 
that every well-ordered set has an ordinal and a cardinal number 
[Hobson 1905, 173-1851. 
Hobson's critique provoked lengthy articles to the London 
Mathematical Society by Hardy, Russell, and Jourdain. On 3 
August 1905, Hardy submitted the first of these. In particular, 
he answered Hobson's objections to the construction in [Hardy 
19031 of a set of real numbers with power aleph-one. Although 
Hardy agreed with Hobson that Zermelo's proof should be rejected, 
he nevertheless accepted Zermelo's Axiom of Choice [Hardy 19061. 
In a letter of 5 July to Russell, he had revealed his reason for 
rejecting the proof: "I suppose that Jourdain's and Zermelo's 
arguments are not unassailable even if the multiplicative class 
exists [i.e., the Axiom of Choice is true], depending as they 
do on Burali-Forti's contradiction." For Hardy had accepted the 
fallacious view, put forward by Hobson [1905] and Bernstein 
[1905], that both proofs utilized the paradox of the largest 
ordinal. 
This letter of 5 July 1905 was the last in a series which 
Hardy and Russell exchanged concerning issues that Hobson had 
raised, particularly the Axiom of Choice and the paradoxes. 
On 30 June Hardy had inquired: 
Do you regard Burali-Forti's argument as unassailable, 
apart from denying the multiplicative class [Axiom of 
Choice]? I am half inclined to agree with Schoenflies 
[1905] that it is at bottom unmeaning, though I can't 
put it even to myself in a satisfying way. Isn't it 
possible that your original solution was right (denying 
that W is well-ordered) . ..? 
Two days later Russell responded to this query by stressing the 
importance of predicative functions, i.e., those propositional 
functions 4(x) that do not allow as an argument any propositional 
function defined in terms of Q(x): 
I am sorry I gave the impression that denying the multi- 
plicative class solved Burali-Forti. It is not this, 
but insistence upon the use of what I call a predicative 
function, as the defining intension, that gives the 
solution.... I still uphold the Aleph-series; Burali- 
Forti is avoided by denying that c1 < B defines a rela- 
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tion in extension, for then the whole series of Alephs 
in order of magnitude does not have a type at all, so 
that there is no difficulty in denying the maximum 
ordinal. 
During the summer Russell continued to ponder these matters. 
On 24 September he wrote to Couturat concerning a new discovery: 
As for my own work, I have recently begun to 
consider Burali-Forti's contradiction. I found the 
following generalization: Let $!x be any property 
(propositional function), which always belongs to 
f'u (where f'u is any function of the class u) when 
it belongs to all the terms of u; and suppose that 
one always has f'u-eu under the same conditions. 
Then consider the class G($!x). One obtains 
which is a contradiction [(A)].... In the case of 
Burali-Forti, $!x. = x is an ordinal number, and 
f'u. = . successor of the class u.... What is 
interesting is that all the contradictions and para- 
doxes appear to be particular cases of (A). [Appendix 71 
Shortly afterward, he used this generalized Burali-Forti paradox 
in his response to Hobson [Russell 1906, 34-361. 
Russell submitted his long and insightful reply to Hobson's 
critique on 24 November 1905. Above all, he underlined the dis- 
tinction between the problem of inconsistent classes and that 
of the Axiom of Choice. In the first case he denied that every 
propositional function o(x) determined a class {x:$(x)) and in 
the second he doubted that the Axiom of Choice was true in gen- 
eral. To resolve the problem of inconsistent classes, he dis- 
cussed three sorts of theories: zigzag theories, theories of 
limitation of size, and no-classes theories. The first sort 
permitted many propositional functions but prohibited those which 
were in some sense too complex. Russell noted that it had al- 
ready been used in The Principles (sections 103 and 104). Such 
a theory would assert that the complement of a class was a class; 
it would provide a largest cardinal but no largest ordinal. 
However, he added, the axioms for a zigzag theory were quite 
complicated and lacked intrinsic plausibility [Russell 1906, 401. 
Next Russell considered theories of limitation of size, such 
as Jourdain's. (Indeed Cantor's correspondence with Dedekind 
in 1899, which long remained unpublished, as well as Zermelo's 
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later axiomatization [1908], envisioned some such limitation.) 
Such a theory would deny that the complement of a class was a 
class. Furthermore, it would allow no greatest ordinal or car- 
dinal, and no class of all classes or of all ordinals. Yet 
Russell remained dubious about these theories because no one 
knew how far the series of ordinals extended. Consequently he 
turned to a no-classes theory in which "classes and relations 
are banished altogether" [Russell 1906, 451. This theory used 
substitutions in order to treat any propositional function as a 
mere abbreviation for a statement about one or more of its values. 
Despite its technical complications, it was the least likely of 
the three sorts of theories to generate paradoxes. This security 
highly recommended a no-classes theory to Russell, who did not 
know whether one could deduce from it even that wl and aleph-one 
existed. 
Jourdain altered his perspective a little, but only a little, 
in his reply to Hobson for the London Mathematical Society 
[Jourdain 19061. He now distinguished W, the set of all ordinal 
numbers ordered by magnitude, from w, a set such that every well- 
ordered set was similar to it or to one of its segments. While 
W could be extended, w could not. Indeed, Jourdain insisted, W 
was similar to a segment of W. Finally, he ceased using the 
term inconsistent set, since he now denied only that W had an 
order-type or cardinal number, not that it was a legitimate set 
[Jourdain 1906, 267-2691. 
In part, Jourdain's shift in perspective had been stimulated 
by Bernstein's recent article [1905], which contained the first 
discussion of Burali-Forti's paradox to be published in Germany. 
For Jourdain [1906] objected to the solution that Bernstein had 
offered to the paradox of the largest ordinal. 
Despite working closely with Cantor, Bernstein had not men- 
tioned a single paradox in his doctoral thesis, which was con- 
cerned in good part with efforts to systematize set theory 
[Bernstein 19011. In fact, Bernstein learned of the paradox of 
the largest ordinal from Jourdain's article [1904]. When 
Bernstein first discussed this paradox in 1905, he cited 
Jourdain as the source for the statement that Cantor had dis- 
covered Burali-Forti's paradox in 1895. However, Jourdain had 
stated merely that during 1895 Cantor found a proof that every 
set can be well-ordered. In this fashion Bernstein's misinter- 
pretation helped create the myth that Cantor believed his proof 
to engender a paradox. 
In Bernstein's attempt 119051 to refute both Jourdain's and 
Zermelo's proofs that every set can be well-ordered, Burali- 
Forti's paradox served as the principal tool. Bernstein did not 
admit that the set W of all ordinals (or, as he preferred to 
define it, the set of all order-types of segments of well-ordered 
sets) was contradictory. Rather he considered the paradox to 
reside in the assumption that there exists a set WU{bIt in 
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which b follows all the elements of W. Such a set WU{b) was 
not objectionable, Bernstein insisted, as long as one did not 
permit an order to be imposed on it. Here he rejected Cantor's 
principle that for every ordinal B there is a next ordinal 6 + 1. 
On the other hand, he stated certain "positive" properties of 
W: It was well-ordered but possessed a cardinal number that was 
not an aleph. While w was the largest ordinal, there existed 
larger cardinals such as that of the power set Z of W. More- 
over, he believed Z to provide the simplest example of a set 
that cannot be well-ordered [Bernstein 1905, 187-1921. 
In conclusion, Bernstein dismissed Jourdain's proof that 
every set can be well-ordered, because it relied on the assump- 
tion that W is inconsistent. Likewise he rejected Zermelo's 
proof since it used the assumption that every well-ordered set 
can be extended to a more inclusive well-ordered set [Bernstein 
1905, 1931. Arthur Schoenflies' article [1905], which appeared 
immediately before Bernstein's in f4athematische Annalen, essen- 
tially agreed with this critique. 
Burali-Forti's paradox entered France by a somewhat different 
path. Early in 1901, Couturat was aware of a difficulty con- 
nected with Burali-Forti's article [1897al. Yet Couturat was 
inclined to believe simply that some error had crept into Burali- 
Forti's argument that trichotomy did not hold for ordinals. As 
a result, Burali-Forti's paradox did not become a matter for 
public discussion among French mathematicians until 1905. This 
discussion was stimulated by Bernstein's article [1905] and took 
place in an exchange of letters (soon published by the SociBt6 
Mathgmatique de France) between Hadamard, Emile Borel, and others 
[Hadamard 19051. Replying to Borel's criticisms of Zermelo's 
proof, Hadamard analyzed Bernstein's treatment of the paradox 
of the largest ordinal. In particular, Hadamard refused to grant 
that one could accept W as a set while not permitting any element 
to come after it. Since the adjunction of new elements was a 
matter of convention, he insisted that one was always free to 
add them. "The solution," he wrote concerning Burali-Forti's 
paradox, "is different. It is the very existence of the set W 
that generates a contradiction.... One has the right to form 
a set only with previously existing objects, and it is easily 
seen that the definition of W presupposes the opposite" [Hadamard 
1905, 2711. 
Meanwhile Couturat sent to Russell on 16 April 1905 some 
comments concerning the book that he was writing to spread the 
ideas in The Principles: 
I am happy to learn that you have resolved the "contra- 
diction" [Russell's paradox]. I will not speak of it 
in my book [1905] so as not to confuse the reader and 
make him sceptical.... I fear that an opponent of 
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Logistic, without bothering to study it seriously, will 
seize on the "contradiction" in order to discredit this 
discipline. I admit that I would be rather embarassed 
to respond to such an objection, which would be danger- 
ous in the eyes of the uninitiated: "How is it, they 
might ask, that these people claim to reform classical 
logic and to give it rigorous foundations, while they 
concede that there is a contradiction in their own prin- 
ciples!" This objection does not seem very serious to 
me, but that is partly due to an act of faith in reason, 
which is annoying. What a failure for rationalism if 
this contradiction was fundamental and incurable! And 
what revenge for Kant, whose antinomies are child's 
play by comparison! [Appendix 61 
In fact; soon after this letter was written an opponent of 
symbolic logic, Henri Poincare, did precisely what Couturat had 
feared, but using Burali-Forti's paradox rather than Russell's. 
Poincarg attacked set theory and symbolic logic in a series 
of articles which appeared in the Revue de Metaphysique et de 
Morale and which analyzed works by Hilbert, Russell, Zermelo, 
and Burali-Forti. Apparently he had learned of Burali-Forti's 
paradox from Hadamard [Poincard 1905, 8241. Unlike Jourdain 
and Bernstein, he gave every indication of having read Burali- 
Forti's paper of 1897. After ridiculing Burali-Forti's defini- 
tion of the number one, written in Peano's symbolism, he added 
sarcastically: "What makes the paper important is that it gives 
the first example of these antinomies which one encounters in 
studying transfinite [ordinal] numbers and which have been for 
some years the despair of mathematicians" [Poincarg 1905, 822- 
8231 . Here he was influenced by Russell in that he ignored 
Burali-Forti's distinction between perfectly ordered and well- 
ordered sets, and in that he generated the paradox by juxtaposing 
Cantor's and Burali-Forti's articles. 
Incensed by Poincard's cavalier treatment of Russell's work, 
Couturat composed a lengthy reply for the same journal. Among 
many other matters, he discussed the paradox of the largest 
ordinal. Concerning this forthcoming reply to Poincare, he 
wrote to Russell on 17 December 1905: 
The question that embarasses me the most is natu- 
rally the mathematical one, namely, the apparent con- 
tradiction between Cantor and Burali-Forti. Peano 
tells me that these two authors have corresponded on 
this matter, and recognize that they are not speaking 
about the same ordinal numbers. [Appendix 81 
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Couturat's reply [1906] insisted that this contradiction had 
nothing to do with the Peanoesque symbolism in which Burali- 
Forti had first expressed it, but rather that it concerned the 
logic of classes-- a logic which went back to Aristotle. He then 
quoted from a letter which Burali-Forti had recently sent him 
about the paradox: 
The answer to the critique which Poincare directed 
at me is already found in my article [1897a,b]. I re- 
call here in a few words all, I believe, that is needed 
to pose the question clearly. 
From the collection of Cantor's well-ordered 
classes I extract a special collection, that of the 
perfectly ordered classes. A perfectly ordered class 
is also a well-ordered class; therefore I may consider, 
along with Cantor, the order-types NO of perfectly 
ordered classes. Each NO is one of Cantor's ordinal 
numbers. (But some of the latter may not be contained 
in my class NO.) Assuming Cantor's theorem, "if a,b 
are ordinal numbers, one must always have a < b, or 
a = b, or a > b," I prove that: "The NO, ordered by 
magnitude, form a perfectly ordered class." (It is 
important to note: the NO, and not "Cantor's ordinal 
numbers.") [Couturat 1906, 228-2291 
In 1906, Couturat reported, Burali-Forti still believed that 
the apparent contradiction between his result and that of Cantor 
was due to the difference between well-ordered and perfectly 
ordered classes. Surprisingly, he informed Couturat that there 
was a printer's error in his article [Burali-Forti 1897331, in- 
terchanging instances of "well-ordered" and "perfectly ordered." 
Thus in 1897, as in 1906, Burali-Forti mistakenly held that 
every perfectly ordered set is well-ordered, but not conversely. 
In point of fact, every well-ordered set is perfectly ordered, 
but some perfectly ordered sets are not well-ordered--in particu- 
lar all those perfectly ordered sets containing subsets of order- 
type w(l+*w). An example of a set that is perfectly ordered 
but not well-ordered was first given by W. H. Young and G. C. 
Young (1928, 1021. 
Although no one paid much notice, in 1906 Poincare clarified 
the matter in an article responding to Couturat's: 
After my article [1905] appeared, Burali-Forti 
wrote to Couturat. There is no contradiction he 
claimed, because Cantor's result applies to well- 
ordered sets and mine to perfectly ordered sets.... 
Couturat quotes Burali-Forti as saying: A per- 
fectly ordered class is also well-ordered, but the 
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converse is not true. Surely he meant: A well- 
ordered class is also perfectly ordered, but the 
converse is not true.... 
Even after this correction, Burali-Porti's explan- 
ation is not satisfactory. His reasoning, indeed, is 
easily applied to well-ordered sets and to Cantor's 
ordinal numbers. In particular, it is easy to show 
that the sequence of all Cantor's ordinals forms a 
well-ordered set. [Poincare 1906, 3041 
Here Poincare was correct in two respects. He illuminated Burali 
Forti's misunderstanding about the relation between perfectly 
ordered and well-ordered sets. Moreover, he gave a very lucid 
account of how Burali-Forti's article should be viewed: While 
the article did not contain a paradox as it was published, it 
could be transformed into a paradox by mimicking the same argu- 
ment for well-ordered sets and then juxtaposing Cantor's tri- 
chotomy law for ordinals. 
Burali-Forti's confusion in his article of 1897 had not 
escaped Cantor. On 9 March 1907 he wrote to Grace Young to 
congratulate both her and her husband on their book, The Theory 
of Sets of Points [1906]. Then he added indignantly: 
Do not fall into the error of those who cast doubt on 
the reality and consistency of the alephs; these numbers 
have the same objective reality as the finite cardinal 
numbers known from antiquity. What Schoenflies [1905] 
calls W is not a "set" in my sense of the word, but an 
"inconsistent multiplicity." When I wrote the "Grund- 
lagen" [1883b] I already saw this clearly, as is evident 
from the remarks (1) and (2) in its conclusion, where 
I referred to W as the "absolutely infinite number- 
sequence." 
In (1) I said explicitly that I designate as "sets" 
only those multiplicities that can be conceived as 
unities, i.e., as objects.... What Burali-Forti has 
put forward is utterly foolish. If you go back to his 
article in the Circolo Matematico, you will remark that 
not once has he interpreted the concept of "well-ordered 
setll correctly. 
Enough about this for today. [Appendix 91 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The origins of Burali-Forti's paradox are at once more com- 
plex, more confused, and more intriguing than had been thought. 
In large measure the complexity stems from the divergent per- 
spectives of the mathematicians involved. As we have seen, 
neither Burali-Forti nor Cantor believed that there was a gen- 
uine paradox of the largest ordinal, much less that he himself 
had invented it. In 1907 Cantor insisted that during 1883 he 
had already understood the concept of set in a way that gave 
rise to no such ordinal. Burali-Forti continued to insist, 
though incorrectly, that there was no paradox of the largest 
ordinal because his result applied to perfectly ordered classes, 
not to well-ordered classes. 
Burali-Forti's initial confusion concerning the definition 
of well-ordered set lay at the root of his refusal to create a 
paradox. Although he appeared in October 1897 to recognize that 
every well-ordered set is perfectly ordered but not conversely, 
in fact he did not do so. It was Poincard who clarified the 
matter in 1906. 
Still more intriguing is the way in which Russell inadver- 
tently created the paradox of the largest ordinal. His philo- 
sophical predilection to seek paradoxes in set theory was already 
evident by 1896. The first paradox that he created was the 
paradox of the largest cardinal, which began to take form in 
1899 but only became definitive in 1901. From it emerged the 
paradox that bears his name. Learning of Burali-Forti's work 
from Couturat, Russell formulated the paradox of the largest 
ordinal in late 1902 or early 1903 by juxtaposing Burali-Forti's 
and Cantor's articles of 1897, and by ignoring the difference 
between well-ordered and perfectly ordered classes. 
Yet even in The Principles, Russell's understanding of the 
paradox of the largest ordinal remained fluid. In particular, 
he did not fully recognize the significance of this paradox 
until Jourdain emphasized it in his own work. During 1905 the 
paradox spread to Germany through Bernstein and then to France. 
In the minds of mathematicians this paradox soon became entan- 
gled with Jourdain's and Zermelo's proofs that every set can be 
well-ordered, as well as with Zermelo's Axiom of Choice. 
For later generations, Russell's creation of the paradox of 
the largest ordinal, and the early attempts at its resolution, 
blurred what Burali-Forti had actually done. Ironically, the 
name that Russell gave to his own paradox of the largest ordi- 
nal has endured: Burali-Forti's paradox. 
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APPENDIXES 
The Couturat-Russell correspondence, excerpts from which are reproduced below, is 
kept in the Bibliotbque of the town La Chaux-de-Fonds in Switzerland. The Russell 
Archives contain photocopies of these letters. Finally, the letter from Cantor to 
Grace Young can be found in the Archives of the University of Liverpool. 
Appendix 1: Couturat to Russell, 3 January 1901 
. . . yes erreurs que vous me signaler dans Cantor me paraissent fort intgressantes, 
mais je suis bien loin de ce sujet, et, plong6 dans Leibniz, je n'ai pas le loisir de 
1'Qtudier. L'infini pr&e si ai&ment aux paralogismes! Burali-Forti a pr&endu 
d6montrer que, dans les types d'ordre, il est faux d'affirmer: 
(a = b) U (a C b) U (a > b) 
et que par suite ils ne ferment pas une class? bien ordow&. Son raisonnement est 
plus sp6cieux que probant.(l) Je me demande si l'on peut consid&er la classe de 
to&es les classes possibles sans une espbce de contradiction. 
1. Una questione sui numeri transfiniti, p. Rendiconti de1 Circolo matematico 
di Palermo 28 mars 1897 (t. XI). Je peux vous pr&er l'article, si vow le d&irez. 
dppendix 2: Russell to Couturat, 17 January 1901 
. . . Je suis d'accord avec Burali-Forti qu'il soit fausse d'affirmer pour les 
types d'ordre: 
a=b. U .a < b. u .a Z b 
Ce qui est plus, je soupyonne qu'on ne puisse affirmer la m@me chose pour les nombres 
cardinaux. Les arguments de Cantor 2 ce sujet ne sont pas concluant,. Je vous serai 
trbs reconnaissant si vow voulez bien me pr&er l'article de Burali-Forti, que je 
n'ai pas vu.--Quant .3 la classe des classes, si vow admettez une contradiction dans 
sa concept, l'infini reste toujours contradictoire, et vos travaux ainsi que ceux de 
Cantor n'ont pas r6solu le probleme philosophique. Car il y a un concept classe et 
il y a des classes. L?onc classe est une classe. Or on prouve (et ceci est essentiel 
2 la th6orie de Cantor) que toute classe a un nombre cardinal. 
dppendix 3: Couturat to Russell, 27 January 1901 
. . . La classe class2 est-elle d6termin&, ferm& en quelque sorte, de mani&? 3 
poss6der un nombre cardinal? 
dppendix 4: Couturat to Russell, 21 July 1901 
. . . 11 est t&s profound sow sa forme populaire, et m’a beaucoup plu. sous le.5 
paradoxes se cachent des v&it6s frappantes. 
dppendix 5: Russell to Couturat, 29 September 1902 
. . . Je suis trIs occup6 par mon livre, qu'on imprime lentement, et par le Vol. II 
que je pr6pare en collaboration avec Whitehead. Je ne sais que faire d'une classe 
de contradictions, dont voici la plus simple: 
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J'ai essay55 mainte solutions saris succ&s. On trouve des contradictions de ce genre 
en applicant 2 la classe de tous les individus, o" de toutes les propositions, o" 
de toutes les relations, la preuve que donne Cantor qu'il n'y a pas de nombre 
cardinale maximum. Quand on a commenc6 3 imprimer man livre, j'ai cr" pouvoir 6viter 
ces contradictions, mais je vois a present que je me trompais, ce qui diminue de 
beaucoup la valeur de man line. 
Appendix 6: Couturat to Russell, 16 April 1905 
. . . Je suis heureux d'apprendre que vous &es venu 3 bout de la "contradiction"; 
je n'en parle pas dans man livre, pour ne pas embrouiller le lecteur et le rendre 
sceptique.... Je trains, entre nous, qu'un des adversaires de la Logistique, saris 
se dormer la peine d'6tudier s&ieusement cette doctrine, ne s'empare de la "contra- 
diction" pour la discrgditer. J'avoue que je serais asses embarrassd pour r6pondre 
a "ne telle objection, qui serait dangereuse aux yeux du public profane: "Comment, 
dirait-on, voici des gens qui pr6tendent rdformer la Logique classique et lui dormer 
des fondements rigoureux, et ils admettent "ne contradiction a" sein mdme de leurs 
principles!" Cette objection Qristique me par&t pe" s&ieuse, mais c'est "n pe" 
par "n acte de foi dans la raison, ce qui est ennuyeux. Quel Bchec pour le ration- 
alisme, si cette contradiction 6tait fondamentale et incurable! Et quelle revanche 
pour Kant, dont les antinomies ne sont que jeu d'enfants 2 cbte! 
Appendix 7: Russell to Couturat, 24 September 1905 
. . . Quant 2 mes travaux personnels, je me suis mis derni&?ment 2 considerer la 
contradiction de Burali-Forti. J'ai trouv6 la g&&alisation que voici: Soit Q!x 
une propri6t6 (fonction propositionnelle) quelconque, qui appartient toujours 2 f'u 
(oc f'u est "ne fonction quelconque de la classe u) quand elle apparient 2 tous les 
termes de ~1; et supposer qu'on ait toujours f'u-cu dans les mdmes circonstances. 
Qu'on consid&e alors la classe i($!X). On trouvera 
ce qui est "ne contradiction [(A)].... Dans le cas de Burali-Forti, $!x. = .x est 
un nombre ordinal, et f'u. = .successeur de la classe u.... Ce qui est int&essant, 
c'est que toutes les contradictions paraissent dtre des cas particuliers de (A). 
Appendix 8: Couturat to Russell, 17 December 1905 
. . . La question qui m'embarasse le plus est naturellement la question math&ma- 
tique, .3 savoir la contradiction apparente entre Cantor et Burali-Forti. M. Peano 
me dit que les deux auteurs ont correspond" a ce suite, et reconnaissent qu'ils ne 
parlent pas des m&es nombres ordinaux. 
Appendix 9: Cantor to G. C. Young, 9 March 1907 
. . . Lassen Sie sich nicht "on Denen irre marken, die an der Realitlt und 
Widerspruchslosigkeit der Alefzahlen glauben zweifeln z" sollen; diese Zahlen haben 
dieselbe feste Dinglichkeit wie die van Alters herbekannten endlichen Cardinalzahlen. 
Was Herr Sch6nflies W nennt, ist keine “Menge” in dem van mir gemeinten Sinne des 
wortes, sondern eine "inconsistente Vielheit." Schon als ich die "Grundlagen" 
schriebe, habe ich dies klar gesehen, wie aus den Anmerkungen (1) und (2) am 
Schlusse hervorgeht, WCI ich W die "absolut unendliche Zahlenfolge" nenne. 
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In (1) sage ich ausdriicklich dass ich nur solche Vielheiten "Mengen" nenne, 
die ohm Widerspruch als Einheiten, d.h. als Dinge gedacht werden k&men.... WL3S 
Burali-Forti vorgebracht hat, ist htichst tharicht. Wenn Sie auf seine Abh. im Circolo 
Mathem. zuriickgehen, werden Sic bemerken, dass er nicht einmal den Begriff der 
"wohlgeordneten Menge" richtig aufgefasst hatte. 
t?ech genug hiervon fiir heute. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Our research was greatly facilitated by Kenneth Blackwell 
and Carl Spadoni at the Bertrand Russell Archives (McMaster 
University, Hamilton, Canada). We gratefully acknowledge permis- 
sion from the Archives and the Russell Estate to quote from 
Russell's unpublished letters and manuscripts, as well as per- 
mission from the Masters and Fellows of Trinity College 
(Cambridge, England) to quote from Hardy's letters. We are 
grateful to Pierre Hirsch (Biblioteque de la ville, La Chaux- 
de-Fonds, Switzerland) for permission to quote from the Couturat- 
Russell correspondence. We also thank Mrs. R. C. H. Tanner, who 
gave us permission to quote from Cantor's letter. Finally, this 
article has benefited from the constructive criticism of William 
AspraY, Joseph Dauben, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Esther Phillips, 
Alisdair Urquhart and those in the I.H.P.S.T. Seminar in the 
History of Mathematics at the University of Toronto. 
Burali-Forti's Paradox 347 
NOTES 
1. Moore arrived at this conclusion in earlier articles t1978, 308-309; 1980, 
102-1051. During 1979 Garciadiego investigated the matter further in two unpublished 
papers written at the University of Toronto: "The Origin of Burali-Forti's Paradox" 
and "A New Historical Interpretation of the Paradoxes of Set Theory." The present 
article incorporates, but proceeds appreciably beyond, the earlier papers of both 
authors. 
2. Vis-a-vis Russell's paradox, Albert0 Coffa has adopted a similar viewpoint: 
"But perhaps the impact of the paradox emerged over a period of time, and perhaps 
tacit decisions played no less significant a role than ostensive discoveries" [1979, 
371. In an article entitled "Are There Paradoxes of the Set of All Sets?" (forth- 
coming in the International Journal of Mathematics Education), Ivor Grattan-Guinness 
has criticized Coffa's [19791 reconstruction of the origins of Russell's paradox. It 
should be noted that Thomas Kuhn, who studied how a Gestalt switch takes place when 
one scientific theory is replaced by another [1970, 111-1351, was concerned with 
issues different from those we are concerned with here. 
3. Although Burali-Forti stated condition (b) in this form in 1897, he had em- 
ployed a stronger condition in 1894: Every element has an immediate successor. Like 
all of those who followed Peano's terminology in mathematical logic (and this included 
Russell), Burali-Forti spoke of classes rather than sets. 
4. Russell [1906, 491 noted that Burali-Forti's postulate (1) was false unless 
one also stipulated that any two classes in A are disjoint. On the other hand, pos- 
tulate (2) is equivalent to zermelo's later Axiom of Choice; see Moore [1979, 78-791. 
5. This passage, originally in French, can be found in Coffa [1979, 331. OUK 
translation differs slightly from his. All the subsequent letters between Couturat 
and Russell that we have translated in the text are previously unpublished and are 
quoted with permission. The original letters are printed in the appendixes. A de- 
finitive edition of the Couturat-Russell correspondence, extending from 1897 to 1914, 
is being prepared by Anne-Fran@.se S&mid. 
6. In his article [l&3911, Cantor gave a diagonalization argument to show that the 
set of real numbers is uncountable, a result that he had previously obtained by more 
specialized means. He went on to claim that there is no largest cardinal, since, 
for any set zY, the set of all functions from M to {O,l$ would have a cardinal larger 
than M. The function that he used, in the case when M is the set of all real numbers, 
was vital to Russell's eventual formulation of the paradox of the largest cardinal. 
7. For a study of the philosophical and mathematical aspects of Russell's un- 
published correspondence with Alys, see Spadoni [19781. 
8. Quoted in Spadoni [1978, 29-301. Russell also mentioned to Frege that he had 
recently sent Peano a letter about the paradox; this letter is now lost (see [Kennedy 
1975, 2051). 
9. An intriguing study of the changes in The Principles, particularly as they 
relate to Russell's paradox, can be found in Blackwell [unpublishedl. 
10. Russell 11903, 3671. Russell designated the paradox of the largest cardinal 
as "Cantor's paradox" since it depended in part on Cantor's 1891 argument that there 
is no largest cardinal. 
11. At this time Russell temporarily believed that he had solved his paradox. 
The Russell Archives possesses a telegram, dated 21 May 1903, in which A. N. Whitehead 
congratulated Russell on this feat. This letter of 14 October, and the following 
ones between Hardy and Russell (of which only excerpts have been published), can be 
found in the Trinity College Library of Cambridge University. Certain excerpts from 
the letters of 30 June and 2 July 1905 are printed in Grattan-Guinness [1978, 131-1331. 
12. For a discussion of how either Zermelo or Cavaillbs conflated these two 
letters, see Grattan-Guinness [1974, 126-131, 134-1351. 
13. Jourdain [19041 cited The Principles, and all other references, by page 
number--with the sole exception of Burali-Forti's article t1897al. When citing that 
article in The Principles, Russell had not stated a page reference, since his copy 
of the article was an offprint (now in the Russell Archives) paginated from 1 to 11. 
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